Abstract. This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953-1993, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward drift during election times and the 'partisan' motives behind government spending are clearly revealed: left-wing cabinets attach greater importance to social security and health care than right-wing cabinets and right-wing cabinets value expenditure on infrastructure and defense more than left-wing parties.
Introduction
Modem-day political economic theory is characterized by a plethora of models emphasizing at one time the benign govemment agent providing the median voter the public goods he demands, at another instant the opportunistic policy maker trying to fool the public during elections, or at still another point in time the ideological or 'partisan' policy maker who represents the interest of a certain group in society and who designs policies that are favourable to those groups.
The first wave of the political cycles literature originated with a precursory article by Kalecki (1943) . The literature developed rapidly some thirty years later by the introduction of Nordhaus's (1975) Political Business Cycle (PBC) model and Hibbs's (1977) partisan model. In the PBC model, political cycles stem from the policy makers' incentives to create booms in election years in order to increase their chances of reelection. In the partisan model, different political parties have different preferences over economic goals, so that the alternation of parties in office leads to political cycles. In Frey and Schneider (1978a, 1978b) the PBC model and the partisan model are reconciled. In their model, the party in office implements partisan policies when reelection is safe, but generates an electoral cycle when the prospects for reelection are poor.
The second wave of studies on political cycles was a reaction to the 'rational expectations' critique, most fervently expressed by Lucas (1976) . The assumption underlying earlier studies that economic agents in general and voters in particular can be systematically fooled was relaxed. Alesina (1987) was one of the first to develop a rational expectations version of the partisan model. The predictions of his model deviate from those of the Hibbs model in that cycles in real variables only occur in the first part of each administration's term. Persson and Tabellini (1990) show that even when voters are rational and forward-looking, political business cycles may exist if voters have incomplete information about the competency of the government.
Most of the empirical research on political cycles is based on highly aggregated, macroeconomic variables, such as national output growth, unemployment, inflation or money aggregates. The evidence of the Nordhous model is mixed. For the United States, Haynes and Stone (1989) report evidence of PBCs in output growth, the unemployment rate and inflation, but McCallum (1978) and more recently Alesina and Roubini (1992) find weak or no evidence. Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) examine evidence of the PBC model for eighteen OECD countries. Only for Germany and New Zealand monetary policy is found to be consistent with the PBC model. As to fiscal policies the evidence of the PBC model is somewhat stronger. Alesina (1988) and Tufte (1978) find that in the United States transfer payments tend to be increased during election years and Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) report (irregular) PBCs in budget deficits using panel data for eighteen countries. The evidence of the (rational) partisan model is relatively strong, at least for the United States (see Alesina, 1988) .
As mentioned earlier, evidence is mainly presented in terms of macroeconomic variables. Few authors have tried to detect political cycles in government expenditures on specific types of public goods and quasi-public goods. We regard this as a lacuna in the literature because recent theoretical studies on political cycles focus on how elections may affect government spending. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) present a model in which office seeking policy makers may increase government spending on highly visible projects in election years to signal their competency to incompletely informed voters. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) have shown in a different set-up why government deficits arise, a phenomenon that is explained by the conflict between parties on the composition of the government expenditures and the inability of current voters to bind the choices of future voters. Moreover, several countries participate in a fixed exchange rate regime or have delegated monetary policy to an independent central bank. In those countries monetary
